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    I. 
 
  
In their classic work, The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) deal with a 
number of critical public choice issues. One of the most basic of these issues is whether the 
decision-time costs associated with a rule of full unanimity are sufficiently high as to 
mandate the adoption of a 'relative unanimity' rule (a la Wicksell , 1896). 
In his book, The Demand and Supply of Public Good s, Buchanan (1968: 95) observes what a 
rule of relative unanimity is meant to accomplish: 
 
...so long as the individual knows in advance that his own vote, standing alone, cannot effectively block a proposal, 
he will not be motivated to exploit others for his own uniquely differential benefit. If a proposal is presented for a 
vote that embodies net benefits for him, he will tend to accept it, even if under a rule of full unanimity, he would 
be tempted to block the same issue. Under relative unanimity, it seems probable that a sufficient number of 
individuals would behave non-strategically to allow collective decisions on public goods to be reached. 
The rule of relative unanimity has been criticized by a number of authors such as Fishkin 
(1979) and Rae (1975). Fishkin rejects rules of unanimity and near unanimity because such 
decision rules are likely to result in govern- mental inactions which impose “severe 
deprivations” or tyranny. “Severe deprivations that a regime fails to prevent can be as 
terrible as those it desires to impose” (Fishkin, 1979: 70). Put somewhat differently, Fishkin 
(1979: 69) asserts that “the government's failure to act may subject (a citizen) to the will 
of others . . . whose actions the government fails to prevent.' Rae (1975) also rejects relative 
unanimity because 'we must surrender the right for other outcomes.' 1 These 'other outcomes' 
or foregone alternatives may be classified as (a) the set of decisions that might otherwise 
have been approved by a majority, and (b) the set of decisions that cannot be made 
because relative unanimity 'favors negative minorities over positive majorities' (Rae, 
1975: 1273). The latter issue is consistent with the analysis in Fishkin (1979). 
 
 
*Emory University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 196 
 
We are not concerned here with the former because any decision that achieves 
consensus or relative unanimity necessarily would achieve a majority and would be deemed 
superior on efficiency grounds. However, we are concerned with the decisions that are 
sacrificed because 'negative minorities' may be able to block efficient decisions. 
This paper formulates a simple mathematical framework for the selection of an 
“optimum relative unanimity” decision rule. The approach is first to identify the benefits of 
moving from a rule of simple majority towards a rule of full unanimity. Then, the costs of 
moving from simple majority rule towards unanimity are identified. Finally, the issue of an 
optimal decision rule is broached. This note seeks to help resolve the long-standing 
controversy/debate involving Buchanan and  Tullock  (1962), Fishkin (1979), Buchanan (1968), 
Rae (1975), Tullock (1975), Barry (1965) and others. The closing section of this note contrasts 
the present analysis with that originally presented by Buchanan and Tullock (1962).  
 
II. 
 
We assume a group of n individuals. The group is a voluntary association of persons brought 
together for the purpose of satisfying their common needs. Dictatorship within the grou p is 
not permitted. All votes (which must be either 'yes' or 'no') have eq ual weight. Majority rule is 
the minimum feasible decision rule. A ballot in which x persons vote 'yes' (x < 1/2n) and in 
which an equal number of persons x vote 'no' th us could not result in a decision. 
In simple majority voting schemes, especially in the 'large numbers' case, the 
fundamental problem one encounters is that of the 'free rider ,' who secures benefits of group 
action without sharing the costs thereof; here, decision- making tends to break down. U nder 
a rule of unanimity, the same individual is thrust into a 'small numbers' case, and the 'free 
rider' problem effectively disappears. As Buchanan (1968: 97) observes, if a '. . . rule of 
unanimity should be applied . . . public goods will tend to be supplied efficiently.' Thus, on 
the one hand, a rule of unanimity (unqualified) tends to generate maximum benefits to the 
grou p in terms of efficiency in the provision of public goods. On the other hand, this same rule 
of unanimity -in practical terms -very likely '. . . would result in new, if any; decisions being 
made' (Buchanan, 1968: 94). 
Thus, in moving from a rule of the simple majority towards various forms of relative 
unanimity and ultimatel y towards full unanimity, benefits accrue to the group in terms of 
increased efficiency in the provision of pu blic goods. Such benefits reach a maximum at full 
unanimity (Buchanan, 1968: Ch. 5). One possible representation of these grou p benefits as 
the voting rule changes is show n in Figure 1 by the curve GB, which embraces the range of 
gross group benefits beyond simple majority. Observe that curve GB is at a minimum at the 
point of a simple majority rule, where, in terms of Figure 1, the 'free rider' problem is greatest. 
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Note also that the curve reaches its maximum at the point of full unanimity, 
where the 'free rider' issue is dissolved. 
In moving from a rule of simple majority towards a rule of full unanimity , 
there are increasing costs to the gr oup. In particular, as the voting rule rises 
above that of a simple majority , the probability of decisions being made 
diminishes. In the extremum of unanimity , any single negative vote blocks a 
proposal; th us, the probability of incremen tal decisions being made is mini- 
mized under unanimity. Our in terpretation here of 'group costs' is reasonably 
compatible with the analysis in Rae (1975) and Fishkin (1979) where it is 
argued that there are costs to the grou p from consensus or near consensus in 
terms of government inaction or in terms of the outcomes that the group 'must 
surrender.' Since the objective of the group is the collective satisfaction of 
needs common to all members of the group, a decreased probability of a group 
decision is an increased cost to the grou p. Hence, as the voting rule rises above 
that of simple majority towards that of unanimity, group costs rise. In terms of 
Figure 1, these costs rise as we move from simple majority in the direction of 
unanimity. 
If group costs rise at an increasing rate as the voting rule rises above simple 
majority in the direction of unanimity, the costs to the group can be ted by a 
curve such as GC in Figure 1. Clearly, so long as grou p benefits and group 
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costs are both measured in common terms, there exists a point of maximum net 
benefits from a voting scheme lying between the simple majority and unanimity - an 
optimum relative unanimity. This is represented in Figure 1 by R*, where R * represents 
that percentage of votes in excess of majority which maximizes net benefits to the gr 
oup. 
Mathematically , so long as group costs and group benefits can be expressed in 
common terms, the group can be viewed as seeking to maximize: 
 
N(R) = GB(R) - GC(R), 100.0 > R > 50.0            (1) 
 
where R = 
 
 
                         N  = 
             GB = 
              GC = 
the percentage of the group whose positive votes are necessary 
to a decision for the group; 
net benefits from the various alternative values of R; 
group benefits (gross) for the various alternative values of R; 
group costs (gross) for the various alternative val ues of R. 
 
For N to be a maximum, it is necessary that 
 
N '(R) = GB'(R) - GC'(R) = 0                                    (2) 
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or that 
 
GB'(R) = GC'(R) (3) 
 
 
Eq uation (3) states that the slopes of the curves GB and GC in Figure 1must be 
equal for group net benefits to be achieved. Such a situation is represented in 
Figure 1 at R = R* - at the optimum relative unanimity. 
As shown in Figure 1, the slope of the GC curve is rising, i.e. GC"(R) > O. It is 
Possible also that GC"(R) < 0. In the case where GC" = 0, the optimum 
relative unanimity falls out in a very straightforward fashion, much as in 
Figure 1. This can be easily verified by the reader. 
If the GC curve should rise at a decreasing rate, i.e., if GC"(R) < 0, then at 
least two interesting possibilities appear. On the one hand, such a GC curve 
might be everywhere steeper than the GB curve, as shown in Figure 2. In this 
type of case, the 'optimum' occurs at the point of simple majority, where the 
negative net benefits are minimized. This essentially is the case developed by 
Rae (1975) and is similar to the case in Fishkin (1979). If this particular 
representation is valid, then Rae's arguments rejecting unanimity are also 
valid. However, it is clear that Rae's arguments may be only a special case of 
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the more general Buchanan-Tullock (1962) framework. On the other hand, the GC curve 
might be everywhere flatter than the GB curve, as illustrated in Figure 3. In this type of case, N 
is maximized at full unanimity. In this latter case, full unanimity is the optimal group 
solution, and it is unnecessary to resort to relative unanimity (Wicksell, 1896; Buchanan and 
Tullock, 1962 or to 'autocracy' as suggested in Rae, 1975: 1294). However, as was the situation 
in Figure 2, Figure 3 may also be only a special case.2 
 
III 
 
It may be arguable that the GC curve illustrated in Figure 1 is the most reasonable. This 
argument might be predicated upon the idea that, as the value of R rises above a simple 
majority r ule, each individual in the group begins to recognize a growing individual power. 
This power is an increasing function of R. Thus, as R rises, the likelihood of a decision may 
decline at a faster and faster rate. If so, then GC"(R) > 0, and the optimum relative 
unanimity falls out readily, as in Figure 1. 
In closing, we note that this analysis differs in several important respects from that in 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962). Relating this analysis to a some- what similar appearing one in 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962), we refer to their Figure 7 (p. 86). There are, of course, the 
obvious differences, such as (1) our use of percentage of the group required for a decision 
and Buchanan and Tullock's use of the number of persons required to agree, and (2) our use 
of simple majority as the minimum required for decision-making and Buchanan and Tullock's 
use of zero plus one as the minimum number required. More importantly, however , our 
analysis differs from theirs in its definition of the 'cost' schedule. Buchanan and Tullock's cost 
schedule is a 'decision -making' cost, i.e., it represents the expected cost to the individual of 
agreeing on a decision in terms of '. . . time and effort . . . which is required to secure 
agreements' (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962: 86). Costs as defined in the present paper are 
different. In this paper, they represent costs to the group in terms of a diminished probability of 
any decisions being made. Clearly, the notions are similar, but not identical. In addition, the 
present paper considers cases where costs do not rise at an increasing rate and provides a 
basis for viewing the Fishkin-Rae analysis as a special case. Finally, Buchanan and Tullock 
speak of a schedule of 'net' benefit s to the individual, whereas the present paper speaks in 
terms of 'gross' benefits to the group. 
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NOTES 
 
 
1. Rae (1975: 1273) maintain s that 'the optimum among simple voting schemes is a majority rule 
...' because 'majority decision minimizes the maximum number of voters who can possibly be 
dissatisfied.' 
2. The difference between the higher GC curve in Figure 2 and that in Figure 1 represents the 
additional group 'costs' resulting from in terpersonal comparison; i.e., the cost of the foregone 
redistribution s envisioned by Fishkin (1979) and Rae (1975) as basic to the poli tical process. 
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